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TAB "A"

Comments on IM-341 "Political Alignments and Major Psychological Warfare Vulnerabilities in the Event of War Before July 1951."

I. Page 1, para 2.

The statement covering the Soviet purpose in resorting to war can be improved, in our opinion. It is suggested that the wording found in statement on page 1, 1. Assumptions, sentence (a) be used.

II. Page 1, para 6.

Recommend "anti-Communist" instead of "non-Soviet."

III. Page 1, para 1, line 2.

Suggest sentence 2 be phrased: "Such an occurrence would result either from direct Soviet initiative or from Western (U.S.) counteraction to a localized act of Soviet-Communist aggression." (It is granted that the latter alternative may amount to the same thing, but there can be a difference in that the Soviets may be willing to accept war but not to take on the onus of its instigation.)

IV. Page 1, para 3, line 4.

Suggest deletion of "merely."

V. Page 2, line 3.

Recommend changing "non-Soviet" to "non-Communist" or "anti-Communist."

VI. Page 5, para 9, line 10.

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VII. Page 7, para 10, lines 1-3.

Recommend revision for the purpose of more clearly defining the Korean situation.

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VIII. Page 7, para 10, lines 10-14 inclusive.

Recommend deletion and substitution of following therefor:
"Assuming continued Chinese Communist assistance to the Viet Minh, and if French strength and military resources are not substantially increased above those presently programmed, it is probable that the French can be driven out of Tonkin within six to nine months, and in a relatively shorter time if the Chinese Communists intervene directly. French loss of Tonkin would jeopardize the French position in the remainder of Indo-China."

IX. Page 8, para 11.

With reference to the Yugoslav economic situation, it might be better in line 6 to say "intensified by severe drought" and not "caused by severe drought" since there are other major reasons for Yugoslavia's economic deterioration.

More than the "ideological considerations" mentioned in line 19 prevent Tito's alliance with the West. Fear of provoking attack is also a factor.

That Tito "might cooperate with West" in the event of war is doubtful, depending on circumstances. It is reasonable to assume that he would try to stay out, until attacked, which he would be. In other words, Yugoslavia's alignment would be determined by Soviet action rather than by Yugoslav inclination.

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